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order if they are intended as a means of giving effect to dispo-
sitions which are themselves illegal or against public policy, or if
intended to protect a will from attack which is otherwise null
for lack of form or for any other reason.25 In Kern, the court,
although holding the clause in question invalid as being against
public policy, seems to indicate that if the penalty had called
for the forfeiture of whatever benefits the unsuccessful attacker
would have derived under the will, the clause would have been
given effect, provided, of course, that the dispositions the testator




Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Co.1 demonstrates
that the plaintiff in Louisiana who has suffered harm caused by
a defective product has a cause of action as effective as any
plaintiff enjoying the benefits of common law strict liability in
the products liability field. The facts in Weber are unique. Plain-
tiff's cattle were allegedly killed by an application of improperly
formulated cattle dip manufactured by defendant. Immediately
after the disaster, the plaintiff cattle owner interred both the
cattle and the ominous dip in a final resting place in the earth
soon covered by the concrete strip of a highway. Neither the
cattle nor the dip were available as evidence in the litigation.
The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff; the court of
appeal reversed and gave judgment for the defendant; and the
25. Such would be the case, for example, where the clause is intended to
make effective dispositions to persons incapable of receiving or to give
effect to dispositions exceeding the disposable portion of the disposer, or
dispositions contained in testaments which are null as to form. 11 AuBRY
vT RAU VT ESMEIN, DROrI CrIVL FRANQAS § 692 (6th ed. 1954) in LAZARUS, 3
CriL LAw TRANSLA7TIONS 295 (1969); 3 COLIN ET CAPITANT ST D LA MORRAN-
DIkRS, CoURs I-LtMSNTAIRE DB DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIs no. 1402 (9th ed. 1945); 3
JOSSE AND, COUPS DI DROIT PosrnF FEANgAIS nos. 1548, 1549 (1933). For a dis-
cussion of the problem, generally, see Brown, Protsions Forbidding Attack
in a Will, 4 TuL. L. Rrv., 421 (1930).
26. "If the clause in question were restricted to protests or challenges
by the legatees receiving a benefit from the will, there would be little prob-
lem in the absence of forced heirs. However, the clause in question prohibits
protests by 'any heir,' whether or not he is a party to the will or benefits
thereby. Under the circumstances, the legatees are virtually helpless and
at the mercy of any heir not mentioned in the will." 252 So.2d at 50.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 259 AL. 599, 250 So.2d 754 (1971).
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Louisiana supreme court, in an opinion by Justice Tate, reversed
again and found in favor of plaintiff.
The court defined the cause of action and found its ele-
ments proved, as follows:
1) "A manufacturer of a product which involves a risk
of injury to the user is liable to any person, whether the
purchaser or a third person, who without fault on his part,
sustains an injury caused by a defect in the design, com-
position, or manufacture of the article, if the injury might
reasonably have been anticipated. However, the plaintiff
claiming injury has the burden of proving that the product
was defective, i. e., unreasonably dangerous to normal use,
and that plaintiff's injuries were caused by reason of the
defect."2
2) The plaintiff need not prove specific negligence by
the manufacturer if the product is shown to be defective by
reason of hazard to normal use, for the manufacturer is
presumed to know the vices in the things he makes; and
knowledge of hazard equates to foresight of risk of harm,
which in turn constitutes negligence.
3) The dip was proved to be defective because the most
reasonable hypothesis from the evidence is that the dip con-
tained an excessive amount of arsenic, since the plaintiff,
without contradiction, testified that the dip was mixed and
applied properly, according to the instructions on the label
of the dip container, and harm to the cattle resulted.
4) A preponderance of the evidence showed that the
defective dip caused the cattle's deaths, since nothing else
occurred between application of the dip and harm to the
cattle. The evidence was circumstantial but was found by
the trial judge to be credible.
Thus, plaintiff's case was complete, absent refutation by
defendant. The court noted that defendant offered no evidence
to show that the dip had been manufactured properly; nor did
defendant successfully rebut plantiff's showing of proper mixing
and application of the dip. It is submitted that the presumption
2. I& at 602, 250 So.2d at 755.
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of knowledge by the manufacturer is not rebuttable as a matter
of law.
The most logical line of defense was the presentation of
evidence that the dip contained only the proper proportion of
arsenic. The unique facts of this case, with the interment of
the evidence, effectively put that defense beyond the reach of
defendant. Had the defense been made successfully, it would
have negated the defective character of the dip, which in turn
would have negated any findings of negligence.
The importance of Weber to the jurisprudence of Louisiana
lies in the hooking together of the presumption that a manu-
facturer knows the defects of his products with judicial recogni-
tion if plaintiff shows through credible evidence that the prod-
uct was used according to instructions, and that harm ensued,
plaintiff may have made a prima facie case for a defect, if that
is the most reasonable hypothesis from the evidence. The Lou-
isiana plaintiff at that point is in precisely the same position as
a common law plaintiff operating under benefit of common law
strict liability; for the presumption of knowledge on the part
of the manufacturer has eliminated the requirement of proof
of any particular negligence, which is the principal function of
the common law theory of strict liability.
It is clear that Weber represents an application of the law
of negligence, and not an application of the rules of warranty
or of the common law notion of strict liability. As a matter of
law, contributory negligence is not a defense to a claim based on
common law strict liability. Does this leave the Louisiana
plaintiff in a lesser status than his common law counterpart?
Even at the common law, while the defense of contributory neg-
ligence, properly speaking, is not available, plaintiff's conduct
which in fact contributes to his harm may be admitted on the
issue of plaintiff's normal or proper use of the product, which
is a relevant and substantial consideration on the issue of de-
fective condition.
Who is a manufacturer?
Media Production Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of
North America, Inc.,8 held that defendant distributor was a
S. 262 La. 80, 262 So.2d 377 (1972).
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manufacturer liable for the price of a defective automobile and
other allowable expenses, even though plaintiff purchased the
automobile from a dealer, had no dealings with defendant what-
ever and even though defendant did no more in this country
than prepare automobiles for placement in the hands of dealers
for retail sale.
Plaintiff purchased the defective automobile from a local
Louisiana dealer which at the time judgment was taken was de-
funct. The lower court held defendant distributor not liable,
and plaintiff on writs raised the question in the Louisiana su-
preme court of whether distributor should not be held liable in
sotido with the defunct retail dealer. The lower court agreed
that the automobile was useless because of such defects as
peeling interior trim, lights not functioning, transmission prob-
lems, and defective air-conditioner, to mention a few.
The decision written by Justice Sanders represents a most
sound and equitable declaration of policy by our supreme court,
as follows:
"Louisiana has aligned itself with the consumer-pro-
tection rule, by allowing a consumer without privity to
recover, whether the suit be strictly in tort or upon implied
warranty. [Citations omitted.]
"We see no reason why the rule should not apply to
the pecuniary loss resulting from the purchase of a new
automobile that proves unfit for use because of latent de-
fects."4
The court therefore held defendant distributor solidarily liable
with the retail dealer for the price of the automobile and other
allowable expenses.
The supreme court of course needed no authority as prece-
dent for finding liability on the part of the distributor to a third
party, in this instance a consumer. The general duty of pro-
tection is easily justified. It appears from the opinion, however,
that the liability is based upon implied warranty, and the court's
authority for jumping the privity gap is French law stating that
"the right to sue the original vendor for breach of warranty
of quality is transmitted with the object of the sale."
4. 262 So.2d at 881.
5. Id. at n.S.
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While it is apparent that the case is one in warranty, rather
than in tort, it nevertheless has substantial import in the tort
field for establishing such distributors as manufacturers, par-
ticularly when long arm jurisdiction might be needed and when
one views the law in light of Weber, discussed earlier in this
article.
Along the same lines, the First Circuit Court of Appeal held
in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,6 that Sears
was "subject to the same liability as the manufacturer of the
stove for damages caused by defects even in the absence of
actual knowledge thereof.' 7 It was accepted by the court that
Sears is not in fact the manufacturer of the Kenmore stoves; but
the product did not show that it was in fact manufactured by
anyone else, and the plaintiffs had dealt solely with Sears both
in the purchase and in the subsequent service which was re-
quired for repairs. The holding is completely in line with the
recent cases in Louisiana, such as Penn v. Inferno Manufactur-
ing Corp.8
ANALYSIS OF TORT PROBLEMS-DUTY-RISK APPROACH
Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc.9 is a case of considerable
impact on tort law in Louisiana, not for the result reached, but
for the means of analysis utilized to reach that result. Plaintiff
injured herself by tripping over a ladder lying on the ground
at her employer's residence and sued the contractor who had
left the ladder standing against the house after completing his
repairs on the residence. An unknown party moved the ladder
to the ground from its original standing position.
The Louisiana supreme court held that plaintiff failed to
establish actionable negligence, noting that there can be no
negligence unless there is a breach of a legal duty imposed to
protect against a particular risk involved. To solve this issue
in the absence of statutory or jurisprudential rules governing
responsibilities for construction ladders left at job sites, the
court in the final analysis must simply in its policy-making
wisdom decide that this is the sort of injury for which the con-
6. 256 So.2d 321 (La. App. 1st Or. 1971).
7. Id. at 325.
8. 199 So.2d 210 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
9. 260 La. 542, 256 So.2d 620 (1972).
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tractor must pay, or it is not. Using the duty-risk analysis as
the rationale for articulating this decisional process, the court
said,
"The basic question, then, is whether the risk of injury from
a ladder lying on the ground, produced by a combination
of defendant's act and that of a third party, is within the
scope of protection of a rule of law which would prohibit
leaving a ladder leaning against a house."10
The court then noted that "the same policy considerations which
would motivate a legislative body to impose duties to protect
from certain risks are applied by the court in making its
determination."'"
The ultimate policy basis announced by the court for find-
ing no duty on the part of this defendant in this instance was
that leaving the ladder standing against the house did not create
an unreasonable risk of harm to this plaintiff, because the de-
fendant could not have reasonably anticipated that the ladder
would be moved and placed on the ground, so as to create this
risk of harm. The concept for defining and limiting duty so as
to exclude this sort of risk is also characterized as a considera-
tion of the ease of association of the risk with the conduct of
the defendant.
It is speculation on the part of this writer to observe that
the ultimate rationalization for thus limiting this contractor's
duty to exclude that which he could not reasonably anticipate,
is the basic feeling of the court that it is unjust and too great
a burden to place on defendant to require him to take care to
avoid risks which all of us as ordinary men know would not
cross the consciousness of the individual defendant as a reason-
able man of ordinary prudence.
Adoption of the duty-risk analysis should supplant the
proximate cause analysis now prevalent in the jurisprudence
of Louisiana. Whichever system of analysis is utilized, the
substantive results of a particular case should not be different
simply because one analysis rather than the other was used;
but the explanation by the court of how it reached its decision
10. Id. at 549, 256 So.2d at 622.
11. 1d. at 550, 256 So.2d at 62.
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will -vary greatly from one analysis to the other. The problem
with the proximate cause analysis is that it tends to confuse
the issue of whether or not defendant owes plaintiff an obliga-
tion to protect him from the risk of injury which did occur as
opposed to the issue of whether a breach of that obligation
caused the injury. More particularly, the confusion often occurs
when the issue involves the evaluation of what are commonly
termed intervening or superseding causes.
In the instant case, a proximate cause analysis might have
produced the reasoning that the contractor was guilty of an
act of negligence in leaving the ladder against the house, but
the act of the unknown third party in laying it on the ground
where it injured plaintiff was an intervening or superseding
cause for which contractor should not be responsible. Therefore,
the contractor was not guilty of conduct proximately causing the
injury, although he was guilty of negligence at the outset. The
duty analysis seems to be more candid and forthright in ap-
proaching that decisional problem as one requiring the drawing
of the line at the outermost point to which the law will extend
protection from defendant toward plaintiff.
BuRDEN OF PROOF
Preponderance of the Evidence-More Probable Than Not
In a guest passenger suit against an intoxicated host driver,
the supreme court held in Marcotte v. Travelers Insurance Co. 2
that the passenger's suit was barred by her assumption of risk
in voluntarily riding with the person obviously intoxicated when
the preponderance of the evidence showed that the driver's
intoxicated condition caused him to disregard a red light which
in turn caused the accident which injured passenger. The court
took the case on writs to particularize the appellate court's hold-
ing that simply to ride knowingly with a manifestly intoxicated
person was an assumption of risk barring recovery. The supreme
court added to that holding the essential additional link that
the intoxication must be causative of the injury for the assump-
tion of risk to operate as a bar. The court emphasized again
that in determining whether the intoxication was causative of
the accident, the preponderance of the evidence would control.
12. 258 La. 989, 249 So.2d 105 (1971).
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A preponderance was reached when it appeared more probable
than not that the intoxication did cause the accident.
Res Ipsa Loquitur-Assured Clear Distance Rule
In Craker v. All-State Insurance Co.,13 Justice Summers,
writing for the majority, denied recovery to a plaintiff who as
guest passenger sought recovery for her injuries incurred when
her host driver collided at night with a truck stopped in the road-
way without lights. Plaintiff's case consisted solely of proving
that she was in the car with host driver, and, while she was
asleep, the car collided with the rear of a parked truck. The host
driver did not appear at the trial and his deposition was not taken.
It is apparent that plaintiff could not recover except with the aid
of an inference from circumstantial evidence, of the type cus-
tomarily classified as res ipsa loquitur.
The question then arises whether the bare fact of a following
motorist colliding with a stationary object in the road is sug-
gestive of negligence by the following driver. The court recited
as fact that "the scene was a country road with no street lights,
and it was raining. .. . To the best of her knowledge the truck
had no lights and was stopped in the roadway at the time of the
impact."'1 4 If the probability is that the driver was negligent,
are the scales of probability put back into balance with the ad-
ditional facts that there were no street lights and that it was
raining? The writer must agree with the dissent of Justice
Tate that it is more probable than not that the following driver
was negligent and that, as the court of appeal found in its
opinion, the plaintiff guest passenger had made out her prima
facie case. If one concedes that a prima facie case was made,
then, the other requirements being met, the inference mechanism
of res ipsa loquitur might well have been applicable.
From a substantive viewpoint, it would be regrettable to
remove the suggestion of negligence which as a practical matter
is there when a following driver collides with an object in the
road. Certainly, though, if concurrently with those facts there
are also other facts showing that vision was obscured and that
generally the failure to stop was not unreasonable, then the
13. 259 La. 578, 250 So.2d 746 (1971).
14. Id. at 580, 250 So.2d at 747.
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suggestion of negligence recedes; however, the burden should
be the driver's to show it was not unreasonable to fail to stop.
Res Ipsa Loquitur-Unexplained Fire
In Boudreaux v. American Insurance Co.,15 the supreme
court on rehearing reversed itself and held that res ipsa loquitur
applied in a wrongful death claim based on a restaurant owner's
alleged negligence resulting in a fire in the restaurant's kitchen
which spread to adjoining premises and caused the death of
plaintiffs' decedent. The trial court and the court of appeal
found for the defendant. In its first opinion, the supreme court
affirmed those decisions.
In essence, the evidence was that the precise origin or cause
of the fire could not be determined. However, the supreme
court in the discussion in the first opinion of whether plaintiff
had carried its burden to bring forward a preponderance of the
evidence, made this statement:
"There is lengthy testimony that the fire originated
in Petrossi's kitchen, but plaintiffs did not prove to a legal
certainty by a reasonable preponderance of the evidence
that the cause of the fire allegedly originating in the kitchen
was caused by the negligence of Petrossi and his em-
ployees."16
The foregoing characterization of the testimony is crucial
in an appraisal of this case, because the plaintiff would win or
lose depending on whether the court considered his burden dis-
charged when he showed that the fire originated in the de-
fendant's kitchen; or whether the court requires plaintiff to
show that the fire not only originated in defendant's kitchen,
but also to show the particular act of negligence of defendant
which caused the fire.
The court declined in its first opinion to apply res ipsa
loquitur because "a review of this record does not reflect that
the alleged negligence of defendant's insured excludes every
other reasonable hypothesis as to the cause of the fire."17 The
court then added that even if res ipsa loquitur was properly
15. 262 La. 721, 264 So.2d 621 (1972).
16. 264 So.2d at 627.
17. Id, at 628.
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invoked in this case, "we must find that the defendant under the
present facts and circumstances exculpated itself from negli-
gence."'18 Finally, the court found that Civil Code articles 667
and 669 were inapplicable.
Justice Tate wrote a detailed dissent attacking the handling
of res ipsa loquitur in the first opinion. Then, on rehearing
Justice Tate wrote the majority opinion, which found in favor
of plaintiffs. The reasoning was that the origin of the fire in
defendant's kitchen was suggestive of some negligence, and that
being so, the negligence must be that of the defendant, since
the kitchen ultimately was in its exclusive control, and there
was no showing to contradict that status of the kitchen.
Justice Tate correctly pointed out that
"the circumstantial evidence requisite in civil negligence
cases need not negate all other possible causes of injury, as
the opinions of the previous courts seemed to hold. It
suffices if the circumstantial proof excludes other reason-
able hypotheses only with a fair amount of certainty, so
that it be more probable than not that the harm was caused
by the tortious conduct of the defendant. [Citations omitted.]
"In this respect, the principle of 'res ipsa loquitur' (the
thing speaks for itself) sometimes comes into play as a
rule of circumstantial evidence, whereby negligence is in-
ferred on the part of a defendant because the facts indicate
this to be the more probable cause of injury in the absence
of other as-plausible explanation by witnesses found credible.
[Citations omitted.] Thus, by this principle where properly
applied, the circumstantial evidence indicates that the in-
jury was caused by some negligence on the part of the de-
fendant, without necessarily proving just what negligent
act caused the injury."'19
Doctrinally, the statement in the opinion on rehearing as
to the degree of certainty requisite for winning a decision is
better formulated than that of the first opinion requiring proof
to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis. To re-
quire the latter level would be to impose a greater burden of
18. 14. at 629.
19. 14. at 68.
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proof in res ipsa loquitur cases than in those not so designated
but also founded on circumstantial evidence.
FAULT WITHOUT NEGLIGENCE
In Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp.,2° the Louisiana su-
preme court held that a violation of Civil Code article 669 con-
stituted "fault" under Civil Code article 2315, thus allowing
recovery for plaintiff without the showing of negligence by
defendant. In such an action contributory negligence will not
be allowed as a defense since the principal action is not itself
based upon negligence, but rather upon the breach of a standard
of conduct set forth in the Civil Code.
The plaintiff in Langlois was a fireman injured by his in-
halation of a dangerous gas escaping from defendant's tanks
located on defendant's premises. Plaintiff was engaged in his
calling as a fireman at the time of the injury and was perform-
ing rescue work off defendant's premises.
Prior to Langlois, a plaintiff might have sought recovery
under these circumstances by basing his case on a strained
application of article 667. Under Langlois, a plaintiff finds a
more rational basis for liability in resting his case on article
669, which the court indicates will be interpreted liberally and
will place responsibility on land occupiers for a broad range of
activities causing harm to virtually all categories of injured
parties.
Langlois effectively defines "fault" under article 2315: "Fault
is not limited to moral wrongs but encompasses many acts
which are merely forbidden by law."21 Putting it in still other
words, the court said:
"The defendant has injured this plaintiff by its fault as
analogized from the conduct required under Civil Code
Article 669 and others, and responsibility for the damage
attaches to defendants under Civil Code Article 2315."22
In Langlois, the analogized standard of conduct was drawn
from article 669. The court classified defendant's conduct as an
20. 258 La. 1067, 249 So.2d 133 (1971).
21. Id. at 1076, 249 So.2d at 137.
22. Id. at 1084, 249 So.2d at 140.
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ultra-hazardous activity. It is not surprising that contributory
negligence was excluded as a defense, since even at the common
law contributory negligence is not recognized as a defense when
strict liability is assessed against ultra-hazardous activities. It
should follow from this rule of analogized standards of conduct
that responsibility for damages under article 667 as applied
in Chaney v. Travelers Insurance Co.,2 8 should be assessed under
article 2315.
It seems essential in using these analogized standards of
conduct to constitute fault to examine carefully the statutory
standard violated (whether Civil Code article, statute, or local
ordinance) so as not to preclude the defense of contributory
negligence when the standard merely proscribes conduct con-
stituting ordinary negligence, not ordinarily subjected to abso-
lute liability. Otherwise, for example, if fault is found from a
breach of a traffic regulation setting speed limits, contributory
negligence could not be pleaded against the plaintiff. This dis-
tinction seems to be envisioned by the court in Langlois in its
statement that,
"The activities of man for which he may be liable without
acting negligently are to be determined after a study of
the law and customs, a balancing of claims and interests, a
weighing of the risks and the gravity of harm, and a con-
sideration of individual and societal rights and obligations."2'
In a footnote, however, the court classified a number of
Civil Code articles providing effectively for absolute liability:
"Civil Code Articles 666, 667, 668, 670 and 2322 [sic]
and Articles 2318-2322 also express the intent of the redactors
of our Code to impose liability for fault which does not
encompass negligence. Without requiring negligence by him
who is to respond in damages, some of these articles impose
liability for constructions, others for activities, still others
by reason of relationships."2 5
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Justice Sanders, in Campbell v. American Home Assurance
23. 259 La. 1, 249 So.2d 181 (1971).
24. 258 La. at 1084, 249 So.2d at 140.
25. Id. at n.14, 249 So.2d at n.14.
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Co.,26 laid out the definition and application of contributory
negligence. The thesis statements of the court were in connec-
tion with the conduct of a guest passenger failing to warn the
host driver that to enter a smoke patch on the highway was
dangerous. The court concluded that the conduct of the host
driver and of the guest passenger were reasonable under the
circumstances and refused to find contributory negligence since
it had not been proved by the defendant.
DoG BiT--ONER-KNowiLGE OF Vicious PROPENsrr s
In Losch v. Travelers Insurance Co.,2 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal held that the facts did not show vicious pro-
pensities in a dog which inflicted a scratch on the face of a
small child, leaving two small scars about 1.0 cm. in length. If
the child had been horribly mauled, would the non-liability of
the owner still have obtained? Regrettably, probably so.
As shown by the citations in the opinion, the rule currently
applied in Louisiana for dog bite cases requires a showing of
the owner's prior knowledge of the vicious propensities of the
dog. It is a tragic anomaly to note that were it a sheep, rather
than a child, the dog owner would be absolutely liable, under
the provision of a statute specifically protecting sheep.28
Was it the intent of the Civil Code redactors to leave humans
to the mercy of carnivorous canines? The subject may be
heavily debated.29 If the theory of presumption of fault is in-
dulged, the owner still may be exonerated by bringing to the
witness stand all those whom his dog has not bitten and who
will testify that the dog is gentle. The better view unquestion-
ably is to hold dog owners to absolute liability for their dogs'
unprovoked attacks on humans. The pronouncements in Langlois
discussed above, are more than ample authority for thus con-
struing article 2321 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-PUBLIC FIGURE
On rehearing, the Louisiana supreme court found in Francis
26. 260 La. 1047, 258 So.2d 81 (1972).
27. 264 So.2d 240 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
28. LA. R. 3:2651-52 (1950).
29. Note, 34 TUL. L. R~v. 843 (1960); Note, 18 TUL. L. Rzv. 163 (1948);
Note, 17 Tm. L. REv. 138 (1942).
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v. Lake Charles American Press'* that a newspaper enjoyed no
privilege in publishing its false report that plaintiff failed to
appear for arraignment on a Peeping Tom charge. Plaintiff was
surety on the bond for the person arraigned, and it was clear
error on the part of the newspaper to report as it did. The
issue was whether defendant could claim privilege as set forth
in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,31 in which the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the public figures subject to fair comment absent
reckless disregard included private individuals involved in a
matter of public interest. Justice Sanders in speaking for the
majority on rehearing pointed out that it was the failure to
show for arraignment which was the matter of public interest
and there was no factual connection or involvement of plaintiff
with that failure to appear. If the involvement of a private
individual in a matter of public interest could be founded upon
a false report of involvement then no erroneous reporting what-
ever would be beyond the privilege. Accordingly, the liability
of the defendant was upheld. It is a laudable decision, furnishing
some restraint on the rapid erosion of an already too-small
island of privacy enjoyed by private citizens.
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
Robert A. Pascal*
EFFECT OF AMENDMENTS TO LEGISLATION ON
PRFX-EXISTNG MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
Probably the most important single issue of law raised in
any matrimonial regimes decision discussed in this section of
the Symposium is whether the 1944 amendment to article 2386
of the Civil Code applies to community of gains regimes then
already in existence. The Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, dis-
missed the affirmative contention with the statement: "We do
not believe this to be the intent of the amendment. The amend-
ment was intended to affect existing community of ... gains as
well as those established after its enactment."' The matter de-
serves more consideration.
30. 265 So.2d 206 (La. 1972).
81. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. McElwee v. McElwee, 255 So.2d 833, 888 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
